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Abstract Consider atw0-person zero um game constructed by adynamic
fractional form. We establish the upper value as well as the lower value of a
dynamic fractional game, and prove that the dual gap is equal to zero under
certain conditions. It is also established that the saddle point function exists
in the fractional game system under certain conditions so that the equilibrium
point exists in this game system.
1. Introduction
In 1953 Pun [5] proved minimax theorems for afunction $f$ defined on the product set
$X\cross \mathrm{Y}$ of two arbitrary sets $X$, $\mathrm{Y}$ (not necessary topologized and need not be linear).
That is the equality
$\mathrm{m}_{X}\max f(x, y)=\max_{y\in \mathrm{Y}}\min_{x\in X}f(x, y)$
x%X $y\in \mathrm{Y}$
holds under certain conditions. Fun’s results were widely applied to many directions.
By the above idea on minimax identity, we will constitute atw0-person zero um dynamic
game for fractional type :
$\phi(x,y)=\frac{f(x,y)}{g(x,y)}$ , $(x, y)\in X\mathrm{x}$ Y.
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Several types of game systems have been discussed and investigated by Lai and Tanaka
in [12-19] and [24]. See also the related work in [7], [20, 21, 25]. These games involved n-
person noncooperative dynamic systems in various spaces (cf. [12-17], [19] and [25]) and
tw0-person zer0-sum games (see [7], [20-21], [24]). Recently, many authors investigated
fractional programming; see for example [3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 11], [22] and [23]. Lai et al.
investigated minimax fractional programming in [9, 10, 11] and propose that aminimax
theory for fractional objective $f(x, y)/g(x, y)$ could be applied to tw0-person zer0-sum
game theory.
Following this approach, we consider atw0-person zer0-sum dynamic fractional game
in this paper, and investigate an existence theorem for the saddle value function in a
fractional game system.
2. Preliminaries
In atw0-person zer0-sum game, we will investigate whether two persons will attain a
saddle point in the game system, that is we want to find avalue function such that the
two persons can obtain an equilibrium point.
AtwO-person zer0-sum dynamic game with aparameter 0at adiscrete time $n\in N$ ,
denoted briefly by the game $(\mathrm{D}\mathrm{G}\mathrm{P}_{\theta})$ , includes the following seven elements:
$(S_{n}, A_{n}, B_{n}, t_{n+1}, u_{n}, v_{n}, \theta)$
where each element is defined as follows, and for convenience of the mathematical analysis,
the assumptions below are made.
1) $S_{n}$ is the state space at time $n\in N$ , which is assumed to be aseparable
complete metrizable Borel space, so that the Borel functions defined on $S_{n}$ are
integrable over such aspace.
2) $A_{n}$ and $B_{n}$ are, respectively, the action spaces at time $n\in N$ for players Iand
II in which each player chooses his (or her) actions in the game system. Here $A_{n}$
and $B_{n}$ are always assumed to be Borel spaces.
3) $\{t_{n+1}\}$ is asequence of transition probabilities from time $n$ to time $n+1$
in the law of motion for the game system. When the two players have finished
their actions at time $n$ , denoted by $H_{n}A_{n}B_{n}$ , then the system is moved to state
$S_{n+1}$ . Here $H_{n}$ stands for the histories up to time $n$ , thus $H_{1}=S_{1}$ , $H_{n}=$
$S_{1}A_{1}B_{1}S_{2}A_{2}B_{2}\cdots$ $S_{n-1}A_{n-1}B_{n-1}S_{n}$ , $n=2,3$, $\cdots$ and $H_{\infty}$ stands for the set of
infinite histories of the game system.
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4) $u_{n}$ : $H_{n}A_{n}B_{n}arrow R$ and $v_{n}$ : $H_{n}A_{n}B_{n}arrow R^{+}$ are bounded Borel measurable
functions, and as the time $n$ goes to infinity, they have the limits as follows
$\lim_{narrow\infty}u_{n}=u\in R$ , $n.arrow\infty \mathrm{h}\mathrm{m}v_{n}=v\in R^{+}$ .
Of course $u_{n}$ and $v_{n}$ are also regarded as functions on $H_{\infty}$ .
5) 0: $S_{1}arrow R$ is agiven parameter function on which the loss function of player I
at time $n\in N$ is given by
$T_{\theta}^{n}=u_{n}-\theta v_{n}$
and the gain (loss) function of player II at time $n\in N$ is given by
$-T_{\theta}^{n}$ .
Then the sum of the two values is always zero.
We denote by $F_{n}(\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{p}. G_{n})$ the set of all universal measurable transition probabilities
from history $H_{n}$ to $A_{n}$ (resp. $B_{n}$ ), and consider the sequence $f=\{f_{n}\}$ (resp. $g=\{g_{n}\}$ )
with $f_{n}\in F_{n}$ (resp. $g_{n}\in G_{n}$ ) for each time $n\in N$ .
Let $E_{f_{n}}$ , $E_{g_{n}}$ , $E_{t_{n+1}}$ denote the conditional expectation operators with respect to
$f_{n}\in F_{n}$ , $g_{n}\in G_{n}$ and $t_{n+1}$ , respectively. Then each pair of strategies $f=\{f_{n}\}$ and
$g=\{g_{n}\}$ , together with the law of motion $\{t_{n+1}\}$ , defines aunique universally measurable
transition probability by
$P_{fg}(\cdot|\cdot)$ from $S_{1}arrow A_{1}B_{1}S_{2}A_{2}B_{2}S_{3}\cdots$
such that, for two bounded Borel measurable functions un, $v_{n}$ defined on $H_{n}A_{n}B_{n}(n\in$
$N)$ , and for $s_{1}\in S_{1}$ and $h\in H_{\infty}$ , we have





Under our assumptions, by the dominated convergence theorem and the Fubini theorem,
we infer that, for each $s_{1}\in S_{1}$ , $f=\{f_{n}\}\in F$ and $g=\{g_{n}\}\in G$ , it would have














together with the upper value function of the game
$\overline{T}_{\theta}(s_{1})=\inf_{f\in F}\sup_{g\in G}T_{\theta}(f, g)(s_{1})$ ,
and the lower value function of the game
$\underline{\mathrm{T}}(s_{1})=\sup_{g\in G}\inf_{f\in F}T_{\theta}(f, g)(s_{1})$ .
We call the interval $[_{-}\mathrm{T}_{\mathit{4}}(s_{1}),\overline{T}_{\theta}(s_{1})]$ the dual gap of $(\mathrm{D}\mathrm{G}\mathrm{P}_{\theta})$ , and say that the game
system has asaddle value function, (or shortly, avalue function) if
$\overline{T}_{\theta}(s_{1})=\underline{\mathrm{T}}(s_{1})=T_{\theta}^{*}(s_{1})$ , for $s_{1}\in S_{1}$ .
In this paper, we will consider the fractional dynamic game of the form
$W(f, g)(s_{1})= \frac{U(f,g)(s_{1})}{V(f,g)(s_{1})}$ , $(f, g)\in F\cross G$
and investigate the upper value function
$\overline{\theta}(s_{1})=\inf_{f\in F}\sup_{g\in G}W(f, g)(s_{1})$
and the lower value function
$\underline{\theta}(s_{1})=\sup_{g\in G}\inf_{f\in F}W(f, g)(s_{1})$ .
Furthermore, it is natural to ask whether azero duality gap exists in the game system.
That is, under what conditions one can get acommon value function for upper value
function and lower value function, that is,
$\overline{\theta}(s_{1})=\underline{\theta}(s_{1})=\theta^{*}(s_{1})$ , for $s_{1}\in S_{1}$ .
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3. ATwO-Person ZerO-Sum Dynamic Fractional Game
According to the arguments given in Section 2, we define atw0-person ZerO-Sum
dynamic fractional game (DFG) as the following set of elements:
$(S_{n}, A_{n}, B_{n}, t_{n+1}, u_{n}, v_{n},\overline{\theta},\underline{\theta})$, $n\in N$ .
In this game system, all notation and symbols are used as introduced in section 2. Recall
the state space $S_{n}$ , aseparable complete metrizable Borel space; $A_{n}$ and $B_{n}$ , the action
spaces of players Iand II respectively, at time $n\in N;\{\mathrm{t}_{n+1}\}$ the sequence of transition
probability regarded as the law of motion in the game system; the functions
$u_{n}$ : $H_{n}A_{n}B_{n}arrow R$ and $v_{n}$ : $H_{n}A_{n}B_{n}arrow R^{+}=(0, \infty)$
which are bounded Borel measurable, respectively, and letting time $n$ goes to infinity,
they converge to
$\lim_{narrow\infty}u_{n}=u\in R$ and $n.arrow\infty \mathrm{h}\mathrm{m}v_{n}=v\in R^{+}$ ;
For each $s_{1}\in S_{1}$ , $f=\{f_{n}\}\in F$ and $g=\{g_{n}\}\in G$ , we assume that the limits of
expectations
$U(f, g)(s_{1})=\mathrm{h}.\mathrm{m}E(u_{n}, f, g)(s_{1})narrow\infty$
and
$V(f,g)(s_{1})= \lim_{narrow\infty}E(v_{n}, f,g)(s_{1})>0$
exist, so that the fraction
$W(f, g)(s_{1})= \frac{U(f,g)(s_{1})}{V(f,g)(s_{1})}$
is well defined. For an initial state $s_{1}\in S\mathrm{i}$ , we define, the upper and lower value
functions of the game (DFG) by
$\overline{\theta}(s_{1})=\inf_{f\in F}\sup_{g\in G}W(f, g)(s_{1})$
and
$\underline{\theta}(s_{1})=\sup_{g\in G}\inf_{f\in F}W(f,g)(s_{1})$ .
respectively.
Of course $\overline{\theta}(s_{1})\geq\underline{\theta}(s_{1})$ for all $s_{1}\in S\mathrm{i}$ , and call the interval $[\underline{\theta}(s_{1}),\overline{\theta}(s_{1})]$ as the duality
gap of the game (DFG).
Definition 3.1 The game (DFG) is said to have avalue function if the duality




Furthermore, if there exists $g^{*}\in G$ such that
$\overline{\theta}(s_{1})=\inf_{f\in F}\sup_{g\in G}W(f, g)(s_{1})=\inf W(f, g^{*})(s_{1})$ ,
then we call $g^{*}$ a maximizer [of $W$ ( $f$ , $g$ ) $(s_{1})$ ] over $g\in G$ for each $f\in F$ in the game
(DFG).
Similarly, if there exists $f^{*}\in F$ such that
$\underline{\theta}(s_{1})=\sup_{g\in G}\inf_{f\in F}W(f, g)(s_{1})=\sup_{g\in G}W(f^{*}, g)(s_{1})$,
then $f^{*}\in F$ is called aminimizer [of $W(f,g)(s_{1})$ ] over $f\in F$ for each $g\in G$ in the game
(DFG).
Next, we analyze some relationships between the upper as well as the lower value
functions of $(\mathrm{D}\mathrm{G}\mathrm{P}_{\theta})$ and (DFG). Then we can state some properties for $\overline{T}_{\theta}(s_{1})$ as well as
$-T_{A}(s_{1})$ in the following propositions.
$\underline{\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}3.1.}$
(1) For two parameter functions $\theta_{1}(s_{1})$ and 02 $(s_{1})$ , if $\theta_{1}(s_{1})>\theta_{2}(s_{1})\geq 0$, then
$\overline{T}_{\theta_{1}}(s_{1})\leq\overline{T}_{\theta_{2}}(s_{1})$ .
(2) If $\overline{T}_{\theta}(s_{1})<0$ , then $\theta(s_{1})\geq\overline{\theta}(s_{1})$ .
(3) If $\overline{T}_{\theta}(s_{1})>0$ , then $\theta(s_{1})\leq\overline{\theta}(s_{1})$ .
(4) If $\theta(s_{1})>\overline{\theta}(s_{1})$ , then $\overline{T}_{\theta}(s_{1})\leq 0$ .
(5) If $\theta(s_{1})<\overline{\theta}(s_{1})$ , then $\overline{T}_{\theta}(s_{1})\geq 0$ .
Proof. Abrief proof is given here.
(1) If $\theta_{1}(s_{1})>\theta_{2}(s_{1})\geq 0$ , then for all $(f, g)$
$\theta_{1}(s_{1})V(f, g)(s_{1})>\theta_{2}(s_{1})V(f, g)(s_{1})$ ,
$U(f, g)(s_{1})-\theta_{1}(s_{1})V(f, g)(s_{1})<U(f, g)(s_{1})-\theta_{2}(s_{1})V(f, g)(s_{1})$ ,
or
$T_{\theta_{1}}(f, g)(s_{1})<T_{\theta_{2}}(f,g)(s_{1})$ ,
so $\overline{T}_{\theta_{1}}(s_{1})=\inf_{f\in F}\sup_{g\in G}T_{\theta_{1}}(f,g)(s_{1})\leq\inf_{f\in F}\sup_{g\in G}T_{\theta_{2}}(f,g)(s_{1})=\overline{T}_{\theta_{2}}(s_{1})$ .
(2) If $\overline{T}_{\theta}(s_{1})<0$ , then there exists $\overline{f}\in F$ such that
$\sup_{g\in G}T_{\theta}(\overline{f}, g)(s_{1})<0$ . It follows that




$W( \overline{f}, g)(s_{1})=\frac{U(\overline{f},g)(s_{1})}{V(\overline{f},g)(s_{1})}<\theta(s_{1})$ ,
Therefore $\overline{\theta}(s_{1})=\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{f}f\in F\sup_{g\in G}W(f, g)(s_{1})<\theta(s_{1})$.
(3) If $\overline{T}_{\theta}(s_{1})>0$ , it can be proved as the same line in the proof of (2) to get
$\overline{\theta}(s_{1})\geq\theta(s_{1})$ .
(4) If $\theta(s_{1})>\overline{\theta}(s_{1})$ , then there exists $\overline{f}\in F$ such that
$\theta(s_{1})>\sup_{g\in G}W(\overline{f}, g)(s_{1})$ .
So $\mathrm{O}(\mathrm{S}1)>W(\overline{f}, g)(s_{1})$ for all $g\in Ci$ .
$T_{\theta}(\overline{f}, g)(s_{1})=U(\overline{f}, g)(s_{1})-\theta(s_{1})V(\overline{f},g)(s_{1})<0$ .
Hence $0 \geq\sup_{g\in G}T_{\theta}(\overline{f}, g)(s_{1})\geq\inf_{f\in F}\sup_{g\in G}T_{\theta}(f, g)(s_{1})=\overline{T}_{\theta}(s_{1})$ .
(5) If $\overline{\theta}(s_{1})>\theta(s_{1})$ , the proof is similar to the case of (4), and get
$\overline{T}_{\theta}(s_{1})=\inf_{f\in F}\sup_{g\in G}T_{\theta}(f,g)(s_{1})\geq 0$ .
$\square$
Next we can state some properties for $\underline{\mathrm{T}}_{\ell}(s_{1})$ by following similar arguments as for
$\overline{T}_{\theta}(s_{1})$ in the above proposition.
$\underline{\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}3.2.}$
(1) If 0(S1) $>02(\mathrm{s}\mathrm{i})\geq 0$ , then $\underline{T}_{\theta_{1}}(s_{1})\leq\underline{T}_{2}(s_{1})$ .
(2) If $\underline{T}_{\theta}(s_{1})<0$ , then $\theta(s_{1})\geq\underline{\theta}(s_{1})$ .
(3) If $-T_{S}(s_{1})>0$ , then $\theta(s_{1})\leq\underline{\theta}(s_{1})$ .
(4) If $\mathrm{O}(\mathrm{S}1)>\underline{\theta}(s_{1})$ , then I9 $(s_{1})\leq 0$ .
(5) If $\mathrm{O}(\mathrm{S}1)<\underline{\theta}(s_{1})$ , $then-T_{A}(s_{1})\geq 0$ .
Proof. Using $-\mathrm{T}_{\mathit{4}}(s_{1})$ and $\underline{\theta}(s_{1})$ instead of $\overline{T}_{\theta}(s_{1})$ and $\overline{\theta}(s_{1})$ respectively, we can
prove this proposition by similar arguments as in the previous proof. $\square$
4. The Saddle Value Function of the Game (DFG)
Now we can prove the existence theorem for saddle value function in the game (DFG),
and the relationship between the games (DFG) and $(\mathrm{D}\mathrm{G}\mathrm{P}_{\theta})$ .
Theorem 4.1. Suppose that $g^{*}\in G$ is amaximizer in the game (DFG). Then
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(1) $\overline{\theta}(s_{1})=\underline{\theta}(s_{1})=\theta^{*}(s_{1})$ , and
(2) if $\overline{T}_{\theta}*(s_{1})\leq 0$ , then $g^{*}is$ amaximizer in the game $(DGP_{\theta^{*}})$ .
Prom Theorem 4.1, we can easily derive the following result.
Corollary 4.2. Suppose that $(f^{*},g^{*})\in F\cross G$ is asaddle point of (DFG). Then
(1) $T_{\theta^{\mathrm{r}}}(f^{*},g^{*})(s_{1})=0$, and
(2) $(f^{*}, g^{*})$ is asaddle point of the game $(DGP_{\theta^{\mathrm{r}}})$ .
Atheorem similar to Theorem 4.1 is given as follows.
$\underline{\mathrm{T}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{m}4.3.}$ Suppose that $f^{*}\in F$ is aminimizer in (DFG). Then,
(1) $\overline{\theta}(s_{1})=\underline{\theta}(s_{1})=\theta^{*}(s_{1})$ , and
(2) if $\underline{T}_{\theta^{\mathrm{r}}}(s_{1})\geq 0$ , then $f^{*}is$ also aminimizer in the game $(DGP_{\theta^{\mathrm{s}}})$ .
Combine Theorems 4.1\sim 4.3, we can state the main results as folows.
Theorem 4.4. Suppose that $\overline{\theta}(s_{1})=\underline{\theta}(s_{1})=\theta^{*}(s_{1})$ .
(1) If $g^{*}\in$ (; is amaximizer for $W(f, g)$ in the game $(DGP_{\theta}*)$ with
$\inf_{f\in F}T_{\theta^{\mathrm{r}}}(f,g^{*})(s_{1})=\overline{T}_{\theta^{\mathrm{r}}}(s_{1})\geq 0$ ,
then, $g^{*}is$ also amaximizer for $W(f,g)$ in the game (DFG).
(2) If $f^{*}\in F$ is aminimizer for $W(f, g)$ in $(DGP_{\theta^{\mathrm{r}}})$ with
$\sup_{g\in G}T_{\theta^{*}}(f^{*},g)(s_{1})=\underline{T}_{\ell*}(s_{1})\leq 0$
then $f^{*}$ is also aminmizer of $W(f, g)$ in the game (DFG).
Corollary 4.5. Suppose that $\overline{\theta}(s_{1})=\underline{\theta}(s_{1})=\theta^{*}(s_{1})$, and that $(f^{*}, g^{*})\in F\cross G$ is
asaddle point of the game $(D\mathrm{G}P_{\theta}*)$ with $T_{\theta}*(f^{*}, g^{*})(s_{1})=0$ . Then $(f^{*}, g^{*})$ is asaddle
point of the game (DFG).
The proof of the corollary is easily obtained from Theorem 4.4.
5. ARemark for further Development
The objective function of afractional dynamic game is of the form
$( \star)W(x,y)=\frac{U(x,y)}{V(x,y)}$ , $x\in X$ , $y\in \mathrm{Y}$.
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Our problem is to show that $(\star)$ has zero gap under certain conditions. That is,
$\inf_{x\in X}\sup_{y\in Y}W(x, y)=\sup_{y\in Y}\inf_{x\in X}W(x, y)$ ,
where $X$ and $Y$ denote the universal strategy spaces in the sense of measurable transition
probabilities. If $X$ and $Y$ are assumed to be non-discrete compact strategy spaces for
players Iand $\mathrm{I}\mathrm{I}$ , then aquestion arises in the mathematical analysis for deterministic
situations that under what conditions on the denominator and the numerator functions,
$V(x, y)$ and $U(x, y)$ , the fractional function $W(x, y)$ will have asaddle point? There are
many authors who investigated this problem deriving minimax theorems with respect to
atw0-variable function in $x$ and $y$ ;see for example [5], [9], [10] and [11]. One can see that
these papers in minimax fractional programming are taking $x$ to be discrete as counting
functions of $y$ . Further problems are implicit in the fractional function $W(x,y)$ .
References
[1] Aubin, J.P., “Mathematical Methods of Game and Economic Theory”, (Revised
Edition) North-Holland, Amsterdam 1982.
[2] Aubin, J.P. “Optima and Equilibria, Springer-Verlag New York 1993.
[3] Crouzeix, J.P., Ferland, J.A. and Schaible, S., ”Duality in generalized linear frac-
tional programming , Math. Prog., 27, 1983, 342-354.
[4] Crouzeix, J.P., Ferland, J.A. and Schaible, S., “An algorithm for generalized frac-
tional programs” , J. Optim. Theory AppL, 47, No. 1, (1985), 35-49.
[5] Fan, K., ”Minimax theorems” , Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. USA, 39(1953), 42-47.
[6] Jagannathan, R., and Schaible, S., “Duality in generalized fractional programming
via Farkas’s lemm\"a, J. Optim. Theory Appl. 41(1983), 417-424.
[7] Kimura, Y., Sawasaki, Y. and Tanaka, K., “A perturbation on tw0-person zer0-sum
games” , Anal, of Dynamic Games Vo1.5, pp279-288, 2000.
[8] Lai, H.C., ”Programming problem involving generalized convex set functions”, in
Proceeding of the International Conference on Nonlinear Analysis, (Takahashi $\mathrm{W}$
and Tanaka T, Eds), pp34-43, World Scientific Singapore 1999.
[9] Lai, H.C. and Liu, J.C., ”On minimax fractional programming of generalized convex
set functions” , J. Math. Anal. Appl. 244(2000) 442-465.
[10] Lai, H.C., Liu, J.C. and Tanaka, K., “Necessary and sufficient conditions for minimax
fractional prgramming”, J. Math. Anal. Appl. 230(1999) 311-328
[11] Lai, H.C., Liu, J.C. and Tanaka, K., ”Duality without aconstraint qualification for




[12] Lai, H.C. and Tanaka, K., ”Non-cooperative $n$-person game with astopped set” , J.
Math. Anal. Appl. 85(1982) 153-171.
[13] Lai, H.C. and Tanaka, K., ”On an $N$-person noncooperative Markov game with a
metric state spac\"e, .J Math. Anal. Appl. 101(1984) 78-96.
[14] Lai, H.C. and Tanaka, K., “A noncooperative $n$-person semi-Markov game with a
metric state space” , Appl. Math. Optim. 11(1984) 23-42.
[15] Lai, H.C. and Tanaka, K., ”On a $D$-solution of acooperative $m$-person discounted
Markov gam\"e, J. Math. Anal. Appl. 115(1986) 578-591.
[16] Lai, H.C. and Tanaka, K., “An $N$-person noncooperative discounted vector-valued
dynamic game with ametric space”, Appl. Math. Optim. 16(1987) 135-148.
[17] Lai, H.C. and Tanaka, K., “An $n$-person noncooperative discounted vector valued
dynamic game with astopped set”, Comp. Math. Appl. 13(1987) 227-237.
[18] Lai, H.C. and Tanaka, K., “Average-time criterion for vector-valued Markovian de-
cision systems”, Nihonkai Math. J. 2(1991) 71-91.
[19] Lai, H.C. and Tanaka, K., “On continuous-time discounted stochastic dynamic pr0-
gramming”, Appl. Math. Optim. 23(1991) 155-169.
[20] Nowak, A.S., ”Existence of optimal strategies in zer0-sum nonstationary stochastic
games with lack of information on both sides”, SIAM J. Control Optim. 27(1989)
289-295.
[21] Schal, M., “Stochastic nonstationary tw0-person zer0-sum games”, Z. Angew. Math.
Mech. 61 (1981) 352-353.
[22] Schaible, S., ”Fractional Programming” , in R. Horst and P.M. Pardalos (eds),
Handbook of Global Optimization, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht-Boston-
London, 1995, pp.495-608.
[23] Stancu-Minasian, I. M., ”Fractional Programming Theory, Methods and Appli-
cations” , Mathematics and Its Application 409. Kluwer Academic Publishers,
Dordrecht-Boston-London 1997.
[24] Tanaka, K. and Lai, H.C, “A tw0-person zer0-sum Markov game with astopped
set”, J. Math. Anal. Appl. 86(1982) 54-68.
[25] Tanaka, K., Yokoyama, K., “On $\epsilon$-equilibrium point in anoncooperative n-person
gam\"e, J. Math. Anal. Appl. 160(1991) 413-42
160
